



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

Hedonistic Theories from Aristippus to Spencer. By JOHN WATSON, LL.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Queen's College, Kingston, Canada. London and New York, Macmillan & Co., 1895. — pp. xvi, 248.

Professor Watson says in the preface that his attempt has been "to give, in familiar and untechnical language, a critical account of Hedonistic Theories in their historical succession." He adds: "I hope that even those who cannot accept my criticisms may find my expositions fairly satisfactory." The little book is written in the clear and vigorous style, and with the firm grasp of the subject in hand, that one has learned to expect from the author. Moreover, these essays are calculated to appeal to rather a wider circle of readers than any of his other works, as they are wholly free from technicalities, except, occasionally, those of his own system.

But it is a matter of considerable difficulty to combine adequate exposition with destructive criticism. Professor Watson has not altogether succeeded in this. While one is never tempted to call in question either the accuracy of his historical knowledge or his perfect good faith, one is constantly reminded of his controversial attitude. He fails, — quite unconsciously, no doubt, — to do complete justice to the plausibility of the various types of Hedonism which he examines.

The first three chapters, "Influence of the Sophists on Greek Thought," "Aristippus the Cyrenaic," and "Epicurus," seem to me, on the whole, the best in the book. While the author makes no pretence to originality of interpretation here, his treatment, — more objective than in the later chapters, — is fresh and distinctly interesting. Moreover, the development of the principles involved is brought out far more clearly in these early chapters than elsewhere. Taken together, they form a really admirable brief introduction to the problems of modern Hedonism.

The next three chapters, on Hobbes, Locke, and Hume, are much less satisfactory. Rather less than one-fifth of the chapter on Hobbes is devoted to exposition of the system, the rest consisting either of introductory remarks or of adverse criticisms. These

latter are, in the main, eminently just ; but they are also somewhat obvious. The student will certainly be puzzled to understand why Hobbes was taken so seriously by his early critics. No mention is made of Cumberland, who was at once the most effective early opponent of Hobbes and the first English writer to state the principle of Universalistic Hedonism. Locke is treated as representing the earlier Utilitarian position. It is to be regretted that Professor Watson does not take pains to distinguish between the undeniable tendency of Locke's mode of thought and his actual treatment of the problems of Ethics.

In the case of Locke and Hume, both exposition and criticism are practically based on the given philosopher's theory of the will. Professor Watson seems to forget that, though his own doctrine of the will practically determines his ethics, the same thing is not necessarily true of the corresponding doctrine in the systems which he is examining. Roughly speaking, Locke and Hume were merely psychological determinists, and, from the vantage-ground of this comparatively non-committal (if also philosophically unsatisfactory) position, they were at liberty to develop almost any one of the ethical principles with which we may fairly assume that they were familiar.

In the criticism of Hume's doctrine, which Professor Watson regards as the culmination of self-consistent Hedonism, he gives what is perhaps his most fundamental criticism of Hedonism in general ; but, for once, he seems to forget the limitations of the uninstructed reader. Indeed, from any point of view, he does injustice to his own ethical position, when he allows himself to write : " Will, in other words, is just reason in that form in which it implies self-identification with an end presented by reason to itself " (p. 131) ; or " sympathy is not really a feeling of pleasure in the pleasure of others ; it is, properly understood, just reason itself " (p. 135). By all means let the bewildered general reader stop short at this point and, before finishing the book, read the author's excellent section on " Moral Philosophy " in his recently published work on *Comte, Mill, and Spencer* (pp. 195-281).

The remainder of the book is devoted to Bentham, Mill, and Spencer. This part is much better than that which immediately precedes, and is, in its way, quite comparable with the chapters on Greek Hedonism, though more controversial and, in that respect, less helpful. Bentham is treated more adequately, though not at greater length, than the preceding modern hedonists. But why is

Paley wholly neglected? Certainly he was as important in his own way as Bentham; and, whatever their conscious obligations may have been, both authors developed — each from his own point of view — an ethical position which had been worked out before their time by Gay and Tucker, neither of whom are mentioned. It is pleasant to note that, while the author holds the accepted view that Mill departs in various ways from the consistent hedonistic position, he does justice to the moral elevation of the latter's famous essay, which he describes as embodying a conception of life "of the highest and noblest character."

The treatment of Spencer is much more elaborate than anything which precedes. In fact, more than a quarter of the book is given to this author. One appreciates Professor Watson's desire to do justice to what he regards as the last important form of Hedonism; but this seems rather out of proportion, particularly as he holds, very properly, that one's acceptance of evolution does not necessarily determine the character of one's ethical theory. At the same time, one hardly feels like pressing this objection, since the work is so thoroughly and well done.

In short, despite certain defects and limitations, this little volume goes far to supply a real need. Its greatest fault lies in a manifest lack of connection between the essays of which it is composed. No serious attempt is made to trace the actual historical development of modern Hedonism. What Professor Watson has tried to do, however, he has accomplished with a large degree of success. The book will certainly be welcomed by the many teachers of Ethics who, however they may differ as to metaphysical creed, find much to sympathize with in the author's fundamental ethical position.

ERNEST ALBEE.

Lose Blätter aus Kant's Nachlass. Mitgetheilt von RUDOLPH REICKE. Zweites Heft. Königsberg in Pr., F. Beyer, 1895. — pp. 375.

Kant-Studien. Von DR. ERICH ADICKES. Kiel and Leipzig, Lipsius & Tischer, 1895. — pp. 185.

The material in this second volume of the *Lose Blätter* belongs almost wholly to Kant's practical philosophy, and especially to his *Rechtslehre*, although there are occasional references to metaphysics, idealism, and history of philosophy, also one item of personal